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L
ittle is known about political polarization in German public opinion. This article offers
an issue-based perspective and explores trends of opinion polarization in Germany.
Public opinion polarization is conceptualized and measured as alignment of attitudes.
Data from the German General Social Survey (1980 to 2010) comprise attitudes towards
manifold issues, which are classiﬁed into several dimensions. This study estimates multilevel
models that reveal general and issue- as well as dimension-speciﬁc levels and trends in attitude
alignment for both the whole German population and sub-groups. It ﬁnds that public opinion
polarization has decreased over the last three decades in Germany. In particular, highly
educated and more politically interested people have become less polarized over time. However,
polarization seems to have increased in attitudes regarding gender issues. These ﬁndings provide
interesting contrasts to existing research on the American public.
P
ublic opinion polarization (POP) affects a society’s ability to reach consensus on a
set of issues in the political arena. As POP grows, the likelihood rises that social
groups with irreconcilable policy preferences will be formed (DiMaggio, Evans and
Bryson 1996, 693). As a consequence, public arenas are divided into adverse groups that
are increasingly unable to cooperate because of their contradictory positions. This, in
turn, may lead to an increase in conﬂicts within a society. Moreover, POP translates into
the political sphere as citizens engage in politics and politicians respond to the preferences
of their respective constituencies (their electoral bases) (Abramowitz 2006, 73). This
inﬂuence can impair a political system’s capacity for reform and effective policy making
(Galston and Nivola 2006; Brady, Ferejohn and Harbridge 2008).
Following discussions on elite polarization,1 several prominent review articles by
Fiorina and Abrams (2008), Hetherington (2009), and Fischer and Mattson (2009)
highlight the increasing scientiﬁc interest in POP. However, research on POP to date has
largely been conﬁned to the US context and centers around the question of whether
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American public opinion is more polarized today than in the past.2 In a key study,
DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996) investigate opinion polarization in the United
States, relying on different measures and using data both from the General Social Survey
and the National Election Survey, spanning a period of 20 years. They ﬁnd a trend
towards consensus on racial, gender and crime issues; stability on numerous others; and
evidence of polarization only on attitudes toward abortion, the poor and (more recently)
sexual morality. The conclusions drawn by DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996) were
conﬁrmed by Evans (2003), who used additional data. These and other studies identify
increasing trends of polarization only for sub-groups of partisans—measured either by
party afﬁliation or self-identiﬁcation between liberals and conservatives—and secular
versus religious voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009;
DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005; Layman and Carsey
2002). In another widely noticed study, Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) analyze
polarization across a variety of attitudes and conclude that opinion changes in the
United States reﬂect more a resorting of party labels among voters than greater
polarization across issues. Only recently have a few studies started to investigate POP in
Europe. Adams, Green and Milazzo (2012a,b) ﬁnd a depolarizing trend within the British
public between 1987 and 2001 that mimics an analogous trend in the political system, that
is, between Labour and the Tories. Adams, De Vries and Leiter (2011) diagnose similar
developments for the Netherlands between 1986 and 1998. Finally, Down and Wilson
(2010) focus on a single opinion item (respondents’ support for their country’s EU
membership) and investigate the causal link between opinion polarization and interparty
competition in Europe.
Given the rising scholarly interest in the United States, and the relevance of the
phenomenon for contemporary democratic states, it is astonishing that, with the
exceptions just mentioned, polarization has been largely neglected within the realms of
European political science. In our study we pursue the following research question: How
has public opinion polarization in Germany developed over the last decades? To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that investigates POP in Germany. Following Baldassarri
and Gelman (2008, 409), we conceive POP as alignment along multiple attitude scales.3 As
we will argue in detail, this conception and corresponding measurement has several
advantages over other measures of POP. In general, we pursue a descriptive research
agenda,4 and our study serves as a point of comparison for both existing5 and future
research. We ﬁnd that public opinion polarization has decreased over the last three
decades in Germany. In particular, highly educated and more politically interested people
2 Corresponding research mostly carries the label ‘‘political polarization,’’ a term that has suffered
from ambiguity, which has produced different conclusions in what is regarded as the polarization of the
American public (Hetherington 2009, 447). Fiorina and Abrams (2008) convincingly argue that the many
ways in which political polarization has been conceptualized do not properly reﬂect the concept of
political polarization. According to Fiorina and Abrams, comparing the political attitudes of respondents
is straightforward, in contrast to several other methods of measurement (for example, vote choices as
indicators of polarization). In our view it makes sense to clarify the respective focus on attitudes by using
the term ‘‘public opinion polarization’’.
3 We try to use consistent terminology throughout this study. We use Converse’s (1964) measure of
constraint to study attitude alignment (issue alignment in the terms of Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).
However, we refer only marginally to the debate on constraint in mass political belief systems.
4 See Gerring 2012.
5 For example, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008.
68 MUNZERT AND BAUER
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2013.7
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
have become less polarized over time. However polarization seems to have increased
regarding attitudes towards gender issues.
We ﬁrst outline our conception of POP and demonstrate its theoretical advantages and
the practical beneﬁts of our measurement approach. Next, we present the data and offer
an initial overview of the attitude scales taken into consideration. We then describe
our modeling strategy and delineate the empirical results, ﬁrst with regards to attitude
alignment within the whole population, then focusing on several sub-groups. Several
robustness checks complete the analysis. The article concludes with a discussion of the
results and their implications for future research.
CONCEPTION AND MEASUREMENT OF POP
A population may be polarized with regard to a single issue—for example, the question of
legalizing abortion—or it may comprise people who are polarized on many issues. In the
latter case, a population may be divided along multiple lines, for example pro-abortionists
versus anti-abortionists, weapon haters versus weapon fanatics and proponents of state
intervention versus advocates of a free market. However, we argue that POP only
generates the previously mentioned negative effects if these groups overlap—for example,
if anti-abortionists, weapon haters and state interventionists are in one camp that stands
against the camp of anti-abortionists, pro-weapon fanatics and free market proponents.
In other words: ‘‘[I]f people align along multiple, potentially divisive issues, even if they
do not take extreme positions on single issues, the end result is a polarized society’’
(Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, 409). Following this logic, POP is conceived here as
alignment along multiple scales that measure attitudes towards different issues.
A conventional measure of alignment is the correlation coefﬁcient, which is higher
when individuals have similar attitudes, that is, choose similar positions on two different
attitude scales. Subsequently, one may take averages across pairwise correlations for
groups of attitude scales that belong to certain issue dimensions or for all attitude scales.
The correlation measure features two useful characteristics. First, as the correlation
between attitude scales increases, the variance of the average opinion score distribution
grows as well (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, 419). An individual’s average opinion score
is simply the average of his or her positions on the combined scales. The average score
distribution is then the distribution of all individual average opinion scores. In other
words, the higher the correlation between these scales, the higher the share of individuals
with extreme opinions on average across all scales. Hence, the correlation measure also
accounts for extremities in attitudes. Secondly, populations can be divided into opposing
clusters, which captures the idea of camps opposing each other across a number of issues.
Baldassarri and Gelman (2008, 419) show analytically for a four-dimensional case that
the distance between individuals who belong to the same cluster decreases, while the
distance between alternative clusters increases as the correlation between attitude scales
increases. In other words, for high levels of polarization, the average distance between
individuals within a certain cluster is lower. As the correlation decreases, it is also harder
to predict values on different attitude scales based on an individual’s position on one
speciﬁc attitude scale.6
6 Note that one can use other measures of polarization, for example kurtosis or variance, to identify
other, speciﬁc aspects of polarization (see, however, Downey and Huffman (2001) for a detailed
discussion of problems with such single-scale measures). To take the latter as an example, variance as a
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In the following description, which draws on DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996,
696–97), it becomes apparent that the multi-issue conception of POP is better able to
capture general trends of polarization than measures that focus on single issues. Imagine a
society in which individuals are highly polarized—that is, they have extreme positions on
different issues. At the same time, these individuals show no alignment with regards to
their different attitude scale positions: two individuals may be close to each other on one
scale, but take up completely opposed positions on the next scale. Instead of large stable
camps that occupy the same position on several attitude scales, such a society will be
characterized by groups that huddle around positions on single attitude scales, only to
subsequently dissolve due to the heterogeneity of their positions on different scales. As a
consequence, the probability for political conﬂict is lower than in the case of strongly
correlated (aligned) attitude scale positions (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 577).
METHODOLOGY
Data, Item Selection and Rating
We rely on time-series data generated from the Allgemeine Bevo¨lkerungsumfrage der
Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS), the German equivalent of the General Social Survey.
The ALLBUS was conducted 17 times (usually every two years) between 1980 and 2010.7
In the ﬁrst step, we identiﬁed 24 questions that query attitudes of political and societal
relevance and have been asked at least three times in the period under consideration.
Table 1 gives an overview of the respective items used in the analysis, the variable labels
we chose and the length of the scale on which they are measured. Deciding whether an
item is about political attitudes or not is naturally somewhat arbitrary. Some items
directly target potential policy outcomes (for example, immigration.asylum.seekers), while
others encompass more general values that can, however, be perceived as fundamental for
more concrete policies (for example, gender.job.child). The selection of items likely does
not comprise all attitudes of relevance concerning political debates in Germany, due to
the data source. One potentially interesting item was the question on the use of nuclear
power, which could not be used as it was asked only once. Other subjects, like foreign
policy evaluation, were never included in the ALLBUS survey. To check whether the
results are heavily shaped by the speciﬁc item selection, we provide further analyses with
sub-sets of the used variable set in our section on robustness below.
Judging absolute levels of polarization is a rather difﬁcult endeavor, since we do not
have any absolute scales for polarization. In contrast, judging trends is easier and relevant
when taking the current discussion into account (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 567). Our
measurement is therefore the correlation between attitudes towards different issues.8
By using this measurement, we avoid the problem of missing data on many variables for
(F’note continued)
measure of attitude dispersion is well suited to identify opinion shifts on single items, with parts of the
public taking more or less extreme positions. However in order to capture the general trends of a society
as a whole, a single-issue focus does not sufﬁce and the multi-issue perspective is more revealing—as we
will show in our analysis.
7 Data are available from the GESIS archive free of charge after registration (https://social-
survey.gesis.org, retrieved in March 2013)
8 The presented results are based on Pearson correlations. Rerunning the models with other
correlation-based measures led to very similar results.
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TABLE 1 Question Wording for Items Used in the Analysis from the ALLBUS
1980–2010
Variable code Variable label
Question/Statement wording
(translated) Scale length
v318 gender.job.child.1 ‘‘A working mother can establish just
as loving and secure a relationship
with her children as a mother who
doesn’t work.’’
4
v320 gender.job.child.2 ‘‘A preschool child is likely to suffer if
his or her mother works.’’
4
v322 gender.job.child.3 ‘‘A child actually beneﬁts from his or
her mother having a job rather than
just concentrating on the home.’’
4
v323 gender.job.marriage ‘‘A married woman should not work if
there is a limited number of jobs and
her husband is able to support the
family.’’
4
v319 gender.help.husband.1 ‘‘It is more important for a wife to help
her husband’s career than to have
one herself.’’
4
v321 gender.help.husband.2 ‘‘It is much better for everyone
involved if the man is the achiever
outside the home and the woman
takes care of the home and family.’’
4
v315 moral.marriage Do you think one should get married if
one is living with a partner on a
permanent basis?
3
v357/v359/
v361/v362
moral.abortion ‘‘Should abortion be permittedyif
the woman is married and doesn’t
want any more children (y if the
family has a very low income and
can’t afford more children,yif the
woman is unmarried and doesn’t
want to marry the child’s father,
yif that is what the woman wants,
regardless of her reasons)?’’
5
v504 moral.euthanasia ‘‘A doctor gives an incurably ill patient
a lethal drug on his/her request.’’
4
v512 moral.cannabis ‘‘Somebody smokes marijuana several
times a week.’’
4
v513 moral.homosexuality ‘‘A man has a homosexual relationship
with another man.’’
4
v170 distribution.state.
provide.welfare
‘‘If social welfare beneﬁts such as
continued pay for sick workers,
unemployment compensation and
early retirement pensions are as high
as they are now, it only makes
people not want to work anymore.’’
4
v167 distribution.proﬁts.1 ‘‘The economy can run only if
the businessmen make good
proﬁts. That beneﬁts everyone in
the end.’’
4
v171 distribution.proﬁts.2 ‘‘Generally speaking, business proﬁts
are distributed fairly in Germany.’’
4
v172 distribution.social.
inequality
‘‘Even if one wanted to, there is no way
to reduce social inequality any
further than here in Germany.’’
4
v192 distribution.income.
incentive
‘‘Only if differences in income and
social standing are large enough is
there an incentive for individual
effort.’’
4
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certain waves, as the units of observation are issue pairs rather than individuals.9 The
computed correlations are based on pairwise-complete observations. Table 3 in the
appendix shows that some items were asked only two or three times, but by no means in
every wave. This is not as problematic as it might seem for a trend analysis. Even though
pairs of attitudinal items are not asked in every wave, their correlations—if present in at
least two waves—serve as informative data points for the multilevel model, which is
described in more detail below. We can make use of a total of 54,243 individual
observations and 806 issue-year speciﬁc correlation pairs.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Variable code Variable label
Question/Statement wording
(translated) Scale length
v193 distribution.rank.
difference.1
‘‘Differences in social standing
between people are acceptable
because they basically reﬂect what
people made out of the
opportunities they had.’’
4
v194 distribution.rank.difference.2 ‘‘All in all, I think the social differences
in this country are just.’’
4
v236 immigration.asylum.seekers People seeking asylum? (Should entry
be restricted or not?)
3
v238 immigration.non.eu.workers People from non-EU countries, e.g.
Turkey coming to work here?
(Should entry be restricted or not?)
3
v257 immigration.lifestyle.
adaption
‘‘The foreigners living in Germany
should adapt their way of life a little
more closely to the German way of
life.’’
7
v260 immigration.no.cross.
marriage
‘‘Foreigners living in Germany should
choose to marry people of their own
nationality.’’
7
v258 immigration.no.jobs.
send.home
‘‘When jobs get scarce, the foreigners
living in Germany should be sent
home again.’’
7
v259 immigration.political.
rights
‘‘Foreigners living in Germany should
be prohibited from taking part in
any kind of political activity.’’
7
Note: statements are generally introduced by an explanatory text and ask for the respondent’s degree of
agreement. For the full documentation, see the ALLBUS Data Handbook (http://info1.gesis.org/
dbksearch/ﬁle.asp?ﬁle5ZA4572_cdb.pdf, accessed 17 April 2013).
9 When comparing correlation coefﬁcients over independent samples (the ALLBUS is a trend study
and has no panel component) we make the assumption that these samples are of similar quality. For
example, if sample size varied considerably between studies, the coefﬁcients would be estimated with
varying uncertainty—which we do not incorporate in our models. Varying item or unit nonresponse rates
across samples could have similar effects. Besides, changes in the composition of the realized samples over
time can be a problem if they do not mirror changes in the target population but are a consequence of
different sample designs. For example, a study-induced overrepresentation of highly educated
respondents could lead to a somewhat artiﬁcially increased correlation coefﬁcient in comparison with
the coefﬁcients gained from other studies. However, the ALLBUS is a coherent study project with
17 studies of similar size (each with around 3,000 respondents), with the same question wording on the
compared items and sampling schemes that are all based on random sampling. Hence, even if there is
sample-induced noise it should not systematically affect our results. We also checked item nonresponse
rates over items and years and did not ﬁnd any suspect outliers.
72 MUNZERT AND BAUER
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2013.7
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
In the second step, students and researchers (seven in total) classiﬁed the items
according to more general topics. This procedure could be plainly described as a ‘‘manual
exploratory factor analysis’’. The resulting grouping enables us to trace different levels
and trends of POP not only for the complete sample of attitude scales, but also for sub-
samples of attitude scales that belong to one of the ﬁnally identiﬁed issue dimensions.
Four of the seven raters chose a four-dimensional solution, and most of the items
were classiﬁed into similarly labeled dimensions. The only noteworthy disagreements
concerned some of the (later labeled) immigration items, more speciﬁcally the ones stating
that ‘‘foreigners living in Germany should choose to marry people of their own
nationality’’ and ‘‘when jobs get scarce, the foreigners living in Germany should be sent
home again’’ (see Table 1). The former was also classiﬁed into the moral dimension, the
latter into the economic. We ran the analysis again without these items, and the results
remained largely unchanged. We therefore decided to use the four-dimensional solution
with all items, and labeled the dimensions (according to suggestions from the raters)
as ‘‘gender’’, ‘‘moral’’, ‘‘distribution’’ and ‘‘immigration’’.10 Finally, in cases where
questions were formulated negatively with regard to the respective issue dimension they
belonged to, we turned them around so that the answer categories follow the direction of
the respective dimension (for example, liberal - conservative moral attitudes; cf.
Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).11 Hence, we expect most of the pairwise correlations to be
positive, which simpliﬁes the interpretation of the estimated trends.
Figure 1 provides an initial overview of the 252 attitude scale pairs under consideration.
These correlations are also an initial, aggregated view of our outcome variable. As items
were switched according to their respective dimension, most attitude scale pairs are
positively correlated, and the correlations among scales belonging to the same issue
dimension (framed by black triangles) tend to be higher than correlations between scales
belonging to different dimensions. Also note that for some attitude scale pairs, we did not
observe any correlations (for example, the pair moral.sexuality – distribution.proﬁts.good),
as the corresponding items were never administered in the same waves. This is not a
serious problem for the estimation method we apply. Although it provides only a static
view of the set of attitude scale pairs, the plot gives a ﬁrst impression of POP in Germany
(if it is perceived as a state rather than a process).12 Higher correlations within the four
issue dimensions (around 0.2 to 0.6) show that within policy domains, public opinion
is rather structured; that is, there is a tendency towards polarization on, for example,
family or immigration politics. The correlation in the upper-right corner indicates that if
a respondent thinks that ‘‘when jobs get scarce, foreigners living in Germany should be
sent home’’ (item immigration.no.jobs.send.home), he also has a higher probability of
10 Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) report a similar procedure with four external raters. Certainly, one
might object to this procedure and instead suggest to apply ordinary factor analyses or similar procedures
to ‘‘let the data do the work’’ in identifying possible dimensions. We do not, for two reasons. First, the
data structure—we do not have data for all items for all years—precludes estimating and comparing
corresponding measurement models over time. Secondly and more importantly, the corresponding
statistical methods suited to identify latent dimensions are often as subjective as the approach we follow
(see, for example, Pefﬂey and Hurwitz, 1985). In contrast, it is our strategy to be as transparent as possible
so that readers can evaluate results both for single-item pairs and for grouped dimensions of items.
11 In their analysis, Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) orient attitude scales along the liberal-conservative
continuum, which seems to make sense in the case of the United States. For the case of Germany,
ordering according to the left-right scale would be too simplistic.
12 See DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996, 693.
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approving the statement that ‘‘foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited from
taking part in any kind of political activity’’ (immigration.political.rights). More
important, however, is the observation that the correlation between dimensions is low
to very low (almost always less than 0.2, and often there is no statistical relationship at
all). This means that there is little alignment across different policy domains. If we know
only that a respondent agrees with the statement ‘‘a child actually beneﬁts from his or
her mother having a job rather than just concentrating on the home’’ (gender.job.child.3),
we cannot infer much about how the respondent thinks about homosexuality
(moral.homosexuality), social welfare beneﬁts (distribution.state.provide.welfare) or
asylum seekers (immigration.asylum.seekers)—the mean correlations with all of these
items are virtually zero. This is the empirical manifestation of what we expressed
theoretically above when we argued that POP is only a serious issue if people align along
multiple issues and build overlapping groups. This does not seem to be the case when
interpreting the aggregated correlations. There are stronger relationships for some pairs
of variables, for example, opinions on homosexuality and agreement with the statement
that ‘‘foreigners living in Germany should choose to marry people of their own
nationality’’ (immigration.no.cross.marriage). However the average correlations in Figure 1
do not tell us anything about the evolution of alignment, that is, polarization. The
corresponding trends are assessed in a slightly more complex modeling framework, which
is presented in the following section.
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Fig. 1. (Colour Online) Mean correlations of the 252 attitude scale pairs (across all years for the speciﬁc pair)
Note: positive correlations are colored light to dark green, negative correlations red. Correlation direction is
further indicated by plus and minus signs. An ‘X’ indicates that no observations were available. Black triangles
frame correlations of items within the four issue dimensions ‘‘gender’’, ‘‘moral’’, ‘‘distribution’’ and
‘‘immigration’’.
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Estimating Public Opinion Polarization Trends
To estimate the time trends of polarization, we employ a multilevel approach, using the
year-speciﬁc correlation of pairs of attitude scales as a dependent variable and the pairs
themselves as units on the second level. The explanatory variable is time t ranging from
1980 to 2010. For a better interpretation (and because we are interested in long-term
effects), the time variable has been rescaled to decades and centered at 1994. The basic
model (Model A) is speciﬁed as follows:
rpt5 ap1 bpt1 pt; ð1Þ
with rpt representing the correlation of attitude scale pair p in the year t.
13 Both the
intercept a and the trend coefﬁcient b are allowed to vary over attitude scale pairs.
In other words, we estimate attitude scale pair-speciﬁc levels of average correlation
(intercept) and time trend (slope). pt is the attitude scale pair year-speciﬁc error term,
which is assumed to follow a normal distribution. Implementing a multilevel approach
serves at least two purposes. First, the estimation of some trends may be unstable,
especially when a speciﬁc pair of issues is only observed for a few years. The varying-
intercept, varying-slope approach allows us to explicitly capture this uncertainty in the
estimates. Secondly, simply estimating an overall trend is only the ﬁrst step of our
analysis. In order to obtain a ﬁner-grained picture of POP trends, we are also interested in
looking at issue-dimension-speciﬁc correlation trends. The estimated variation in the
multilevel models gives us exactly this kind of information.
While Model A provides an estimate for the overall trend of POP (the average
of bp across all pairs, bp ! b) and issue-pair-speciﬁc trends, we respecify the basic model
in several ways. In Model B, we estimate trends of attitude scale pairs that are located
within or between issue dimensions. More precisely, it allows us to evaluate separate
trends for within-dimension attitude scale pairs and between-dimension attitude scale
pairs. Here, the time trend variable is interacted with a dummy variable that indicates
whether the two attitude scales belong to the same or different issue dimensions. Thus we
can determine whether attitude alignment between attitude scales belonging to a certain
dimension has risen more than alignment between attitude scales that belong to two
different dimensions. Model C introduces four groups that correspond to the three issue
dimensions and a group for cross-dimension pairs (that is, the group of attitude scale
pairs that do not belong to the same dimension). As ever, rpt is the correlation of a pair of
attitude scales at point t in time and the group level is a speciﬁc pair. The trend term is
now interacted with a variable that indicates the attitude scale pairs belonging to a certain
issue dimension.
When moving to the sub-group analyses, we simply divide the sample of respondents
according to certain characteristics (gender, education level, income, political interest,
religious denomination and East versus West). Statistically, the models follow the known
speciﬁcation.
13 Note that the modeled Pearson correlation coefﬁcients have natural bounds at 21 and 1. We
nevertheless chose a linear functional form, because empirically, the examined correlation coefﬁcients
are far away from these borders (see Figure 1), and the estimated trends do not seem to bring them
anywhere near the technical limits. This approach is in line with Baldassarri and Gelman (2008), who
handle correlation coefﬁcients of a similar size.
German Public Opinion 75
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2013.7
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
FINDINGS
Attitude Alignment within the German Population
Table 2 displays the results of our investigations of attitude alignment. As described in the
previous section, Model A reports the trend across all attitude scale pairs. The average
correlation between scales is 0.19 with a standard error of 0.01. The average correlation has
decreased by 0.04 per decade; hence, there is a negative trend. This result is highly
signiﬁcant. However when looking at the pair-speciﬁc trends, the picture becomes much
more heterogeneous. Figure 2 displays the coefﬁcients for all attitude scale pairs over time.
They range from20.15 to 0.04. One can observe that the correlation has decreased in most
of the cases. Interestingly, the cluster of attitude scales belonging to the gender dimension
(at the bottom left of the triangle plot) shows a systematically rising trend of correlations.
These items have been asked seven to eight times since 1982, so opinions on these issues are
TABLE 2 Fitted Multilevel Models (Varying Intercept and Varying Slope) for
Attitude Alignment
Model r pairs of attitude scales
A No grouping of pairs
Intercept 0.19 (0.01)
Time (decades) 20.04 (0.00)
Residual variance
Intercepts (s2a) 0.01
Trends (s2b) 0.00
Data (s2 ) 0.00
B Within and between issue dimensions
Intercept 0.14 (0.01)
Within dimension pairs 0.18 (0.01)
Time (decades) 20.04 (0.00)
Time3Within dimension 0.02 (0.01)
Residual variance
Intercepts (s2a) 0.01
Trends (s2b) 0.00
Data (s2 ) 0.00
C By types of issue dimensions
Intercept 0.36 (0.02)
Gender baseline
Moral 20.12 (0.03)
Distribution 20.07 (0.02)
Immigration 0.01 (0.03)
Mixed pairs 20.22 (0.02)
Time (decades) 0.04 (0.01)
Time3Gender baseline
Time3Moral 20.09 (0.03)
Time3Distribution 20.08 (0.01)
Time3 Immigration 20.08 (0.01)
Time3Mixed pairs 20.07 (0.01)
Residual variance
Intercepts (s2a) 0.00
Trends (s2b) 0.00
Data (s2 ) 0.00
Note: number of observations: 806, number of item pairs: 252. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. The intercepts correspond to the estimate of 1994 as the time variable is zeroed at this point of
time (and rescaled to decades).
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well captured. We will elaborate on this ﬁnding later. Among the other item pairs, the size
of the decrease varies to a certain extent. On average, it is strongest for pairs of items of the
distribution and the immigration dimension. Three item pairs show a positive correlation
trend, but there is no systematic alignment over different dimensions. In general, with the
exception of the gender domain, Figure 2 reveals a decrease in attitude alignment for all
other issue pairs—both within and across domains. The overwhelming majority of negative
trends (only 18 of the 252 estimated trends are positive), especially between dimensions, is a
strong indicator of public opinion depolarization rather than polarization.
Back to Table 2, Model B is slightly more sophisticated in that the attitude scale
pairs are grouped into pairs that belong to the same issue dimension and pairs that
belong to two different dimensions. Naturally, pairs that belong to the same dimension
should display higher levels of correlation. Here, the estimate of intercept of 0.14
represents the average correlation for between-dimension pairs. The intercept for the
group of within-dimension pairs is, as expected, much larger (0.141 0.185 0.32).
Moreover, we can observe a decreasing trend of the average correlation of between-
dimension pairs (20.04), however, the trend among within-dimension pairs is less
developed (20.041 0.02520.02). This ﬁnding strengthens our initial impressions of the
data in Figure 1. Levels of alignment across different policy domains (which are not very
high anyway) seem to decrease even more sharply than alignment within policy domains.
There is no increasing trend of correlation over multiple issues, which is another strong
indicator of public opinion depolarization.
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Fig. 2. (Colour Online) Correlation trends of the 252 item pairs over time
Note: the plotted coefﬁcients are based on Model A (‘no grouping of pairs’). Decreasing trends are colored
beige to red, increasing trends light to dark green. Trend direction is further indicated with positive and
negative signs. An ‘X’ indicates that no observations were available. Black triangles frame correlations of
items within the four issue dimensions ‘‘gender’’, ‘‘moral’’, ‘‘distribution’’ and ‘‘immigration’’.
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Since the results only differentiate within-dimension and between-dimension pairs on
average, we set up another model that accounts for dimension-speciﬁc time trends (Model C)
by interacting the trend variable with dimension indicators and an indicator for mixed
pairs, that is, pairs from different dimensions. On average, the correlation within these
dimensions is 0.36 for issue pairs from within the gender dimension, 0.21 for the moral
dimension, 0.29 for the distribution dimension and 0.37 for the immigration dimension.
What is already visible when looking at Figure 2 is now reﬂected in the numbers. While
gender issues show a positive (increasing) correlation trend, the time effect of all other
dimensions is negative. The dimension-speciﬁc trends are again visualized for the whole
time period under consideration in Figure 3. Model C reveals the evidence for a trend of
polarization on the gender dimension. The diagnosed trends are disentangled in a more
disaggregated analysis in the following section.
Attitude Alignment within Sub-populations
So far, we have described several noticeable overall trends of POP. Nonetheless, it may be
the case that these effects are driven by trends that only concern parts of the German
population. One of the drawbacks of our conceptional and empirical approach to public
opinion polarization is that we cannot directly integrate individual-level indicators of
status, educational background and so forth, as our level of analysis is that of aggregated
survey measures. In order to check whether the effects remain robust or vary over sub-
groups, we split the sample into several groups a priori according to socio-economic and
other strata, and then estimate group-speciﬁc levels and trends.
For instance, it is generally argued that changes in public opinion (polarization) originate
within intellectual elites and resonate ﬁrst among the highly educated and politically
interested (Zaller 1992; Adams, Green and Milazzo 2012a; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008;
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Av
e
ra
ge
 c
or
re
la
tio
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt Gende
r
Distribution
Immigration
Moral
Fig. 3. Correlation trends by issue dimension, over time
Note: the lines are based on the effects presented in Model C (‘By types of issue dimensions’). Shaded
areas represent 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
78 MUNZERT AND BAUER
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2013.7
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). Hence these groups may be pioneers in public opinion
trends. Moreover, we deem it relevant to search for diverging trends among sub-populations
of gender (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986) and income (McCall and Manza 2011).14 A further
sub-populations that merits attention is different religious denominations (Jelen 1990).
Finally, public opinion trends may differ between East and West Germany, making this
another relevant sub-group division (Wegener and Liebig 1995).
Due to space constraints, we present the results only graphically. Figure 4 provides an
overview of the estimated trends. All ﬁgures visualize results from multilevel models based
on the same logic as the models presented above. Both intercepts and slopes are allowed to
vary for each sub-group. Models visualized under the label ‘Overall’ display the average
trend across all attitude scales and are speciﬁed in Model A. The four other panels under
each sub-group distinguish between issue dimensions—that is, they report results from
Model C speciﬁcation. While each of the ﬁgures may tell its own complex story—and
should be the subject of greater study in the future—our focus is on general patterns.
Levels and trends differ considerably between certain sub-groups, but not between all.
We want to point out the ﬁndings we regard as the most illuminating.
Regarding the overall trend (Column 1), there are no signiﬁcant differences for sub-
populations of gender, income and religious groups. However, the overall decreasing
trend is much stronger among highly educated, highly interested people, and somewhat
stronger among respondents from West Germany.15
The trend of increasing polarization on the gender dimension (Column 2) is similar
across most sub-populations. Only the difference between the more and less educated is
striking. Whereas the more educated display no increase (or a decrease) in attitude
alignment, the increase in polarization seems to take place among the less educated on this
dimension. We want to avoid in-depth speculation at this point, but there have been some
developments on this topic that could put this ﬁnding into context. Germany has seen an
improvement in women’s rights over the last decades. The 1957 gender equality law
(Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) abolished signiﬁcant inequalities between women and men in
marriage, for example women could in principle choose to take a job without their
husband’s approval, and possession of goods was not solely assigned to the man
(Bundesministerium f +ur Justiz 1957). Since then, several amendments have strengthened
the position of women. Nonetheless, public debates on related topics are continuously
boiling up such as the female quota, child care subsidies and child care in general.
One could indeed argue that the gender question remains one of the few remaining
cleavages (rooted in parts of the population) between the left and right camps in
Germany, which have converged on many other highly debated topics such as
unemployment assistance or the civil use of nuclear power.
Concerning the moral dimension (Column 3), the plots reveal a general decreasing trend
of polarization across several sub-populations. However, the levels of polarization differ
14 The group of more educated people was deﬁned as those who hold an academic high school diploma
(Abitur), compared to the less educated, who hold no certiﬁcate of school completion or at most a
certiﬁcate of secondary education. People who are very strongly or strongly interested in politics make up
the sub-group of high political interest, and those with no (or hardly any) interest in politics the
counterpart. People with a monthly income greater than 2,000 euros are deﬁned as having a high income,
and those earning less than 500 euros as having a low income. Other speciﬁcations in which the thresholds
of the categorization were varied led to very similar results.
15 The models for the Eastern sub-group are naturally limited to the variable sub-sample from after
1990 and therefore trends are only displayed for this time span.
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among sub-populations of more and less educated. Moreover, there is a considerable
difference between trends among respondents from West and East Germany. Public
opinion polarization has decreased in the former and increased in the latter. These
estimates, however, have to be taken with a grain of salt due to higher uncertainty
(see uncertainty intervals in the plot, which are wider on the moral dimension due to
the smaller amounts of data). On the distribution dimension (Column 4), we again
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between sub-populations of education, political interest and
respondents from West and East Germany. In contrast, trends are similar among the
other sub-populations. On the immigration dimension (Column 5), trends are similar
across most sub-populations. Nonetheless, the trend of depolarization is again strongest
among the more educated, and there is a difference between West and East Germany.
To sum up, the sub-group analysis reveals some heterogeneity in the development of
public opinion polarization among sub-populations. We will further comment on this
discovery in the dicussion and conclusion.
Further Tests of Robustness
We estimated various respeciﬁcations of our models to check the robustness of the presented
results. To see whether some of the selected attitude scales (variables) have a signiﬁcant
impact on the estimated direction and size of the overall and dimension-speciﬁc effects, we
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Fig. 4. Polarization trends among several sub-groups
Note: shaded areas around the effects (solid and dashed lines) represent 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals
based on simulated responses from the model as a visualization of uncertainty.
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re-estimated Models A and C by dropping every possible combination of one (resulting in 24
different models), two (276 models), three (2,024) and four variables (10,626).16 The results
are reported in Figure 5 in the appendix. It can be seen that the point estimates of the
trending effects go in the same direction for almost all of the 12,950 estimated models, and
show medium to low variance (this is, of course, hardly surprising when recalling Figure 2,
which revealed a remarkable homogeneity of trends within dimensions). There is an
exception in the moral dimension, where some of the speciﬁed models show a positive
effect.17 However, the reassuring insight we draw from these models is that the reported
trend estimates are remarkably stable for various sub-sets of the original variable sample.
Another set of respeciﬁcations targets possible question order and measurement issues.
In general, the selected variables are scattered far and wide within the questionnaires.
However, questions belonging to one dimension are sometimes asked within a question
battery. For example, all questions related to the gender dimension are part of a set of
questions focusing on the role of women in the family, and were asked in one row as
statements. The respondent was then encouraged to agree or disagree. This is not the case
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Fig. 4. (continued).
16 The number of possible models results from N!
n!ðNnÞ!, with N being the number of variables and n the
number of removed variables. Taking out more than four variables led to problems in model convergence
because not all pairs of variables gave substantive information on correlation trends when they were
collected together only a few times. Some of the estimates for the speciﬁcations with four variables
dropped also suffered from lack of convergence and were excluded from the reported results.
17 In every case, the positive effect was, however, not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
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for the other dimensions, in which only some items belonged to the same set of questions,
and others were asked earlier or later in the questionnaire. Asking for attitudes in question
batteries may potentially lead to higher correlations between the measured scores, as
batteries are likely to provoke response set bias; that is, respondents answer similarly on each
of the questions rather than take the trouble to evaluate every statement and think about the
right answer.18 While it seems plausible that this phenomenon may lead to biased estimates
of polarization levels, we do not expect the trend estimates to be affected, as items of the
same battery are almost always asked in the same waves, and because systematic volatility in
acquiescence seems unlikely (see also Billiet and Davidov 2008). Our expectation is
conﬁrmed when we re-estimate the models using only items within each dimension that are
part of the same battery.19 As can be seen in Figure 6 in the appendix, the overall levels of
correlation rose in all other dimensions (about 0.02 points for the moral values, 0.06 points
for the distribution and 0.04 points for the immigration dimension). The trend estimates,
however, remained stable, indicating that our ﬁndings concerning the exceptional trend of
POP regarding gender issues are not a measurement artifact, but are fairly robust against
variable selection in the present sample of variables.
We also speciﬁed more ﬂexible models by including trend polynomials of the second
and third degree. Because the coefﬁcients become harder to interpret, we only present the
graphical output in Figure 7 in the appendix. Trend estimates for the moral dimension are
not reported, as they are highly unreliable in this nonlinear speciﬁcation due to data
sparsity in the ﬁrst and last decade of the observation period. What can be observed is
that the original linear speciﬁcation might hide some nontrivial trend dynamics, especially
for the last ﬁve years of the sample: the estimated slope of immigration issues rises again
between 2005 and 2010. However, the increased widths of the conﬁdence bands indicate
that this trend has to be taken with a grain of salt, so we refrain from further post hoc
speculations as to why there could be a recently rising trend on this dimension, and
patiently wait for new data from the follow-up waves to shed more light on this trend with
a richer data base.
Finally, we employed a different concept of public opinion polarization: attitude
dispersion.20 For this purpose, the standard deviation for each issue in every available year
is computed and then modeled similarly to our standard approach. Single attitude items,
not variable pairs, constitute the grouping variable, and standard deviations measured at
time t are nested within these groups. We ﬁnd a negative overall trend of dispersion,
however it is not signiﬁcantly different from zero on the usual levels. Analogously to our
main results, dispersion is increasing for gender issues and decreasing for other issues.
Again, these effects are mostly insigniﬁcantly different from zero. These results are not
surprising since both measures—correlation (see the Conception and Measurement of POP
section) as a measure of attitude alignment and standard deviation as a measure of attitude
dispersion—account for the extremity of positions on attitude scales. Thus the fact that
the trend coefﬁcients point in the same direction for both measures is reassuring, even if
the coefﬁcients for the dispersion measures are not signiﬁcant. While this alternative
18 See, for example, Billiet and McClendon 2000; Green and Citrin 1994; McClendon 1991.
19 Speciﬁcally, from the gender dimension, we kept all variables. From the moral dimension, we kept
the items on abortion, euthanasia, cannabis and homosexuality. From the distribution dimension, we kept
the items income incentive, rank difference 1 and rank difference 2. From the immigration dimension, we
used the items lifestyle adaption, no cross-marriage, no jobs send home and political rights.
20 See DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996.
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speciﬁcation is not a very strong test of the validity of our results,21 we think it offers
valuable information on the compatibility of different measures of polarization. In the
presented scenario, insights from the attitude alignment perspective do not lead to
contradictory ﬁndings compared with results based on the attitude dispersion measure. We
have already argued extensively why we prefer the former.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Studies on public opinion polarization have been largely conﬁned to the US context. We
offer the ﬁrst descriptive overview of POP trends in Germany between 1980 and 2010, and
ﬁnd that the overall level of POP, conceptualized and measured as attitude alignment, has
declined. This result seems to mirror evidence from studies on party polarization, in which
convergence on several policy dimensions can be observed (Spier 2011). Attitude alignment
between domains is low and still decreasing (that is, we do not ﬁnd a society in which POP
extends over different issue dimensions), and our analyses of trends among sub-
populations reveal that this overall negative trend mainly takes place among the highly
educated and the politically interested. Stronger change among these sub-groups seems to
be in line with arguments that (de)polarization is an elite phenomenon.22 Strikingly, the
overall trend does not hold for gender issues. POP in Germany has grown for attitudes
towards the role of women in the family. The trend for this issue dimension is similar and
increasing among most sub-groups. However when we divide the sample into more and less
educated respondents, we clearly see that the development of polarization mainly took
place among the less educated. This domain-speciﬁc ﬁnding, and the fact that the increasing
trend only takes place among the less educated, is a puzzle that requires further research.
Further, the differentiation between West and East German sub-populations reveals
interesting sub-trends. West Germans follow the general trend, while East Germans deviate
somewhat with regard to moral, distribution and immigration issues. Although we observe
no negative or positive trends regarding distribution and immigration issues, it remains
positive for moral issues. While we refrain from speculations about why these differences
may occur, we think they would provide interesting starting points for future studies.
Just like measurements of absolute values of polarization, trends are relative and more
revealing when compared with other countries. Baldassarri and Gelman (2008, 431)
present an overall increasing trend of attitude alignment (coefﬁcient5 0.02 per decade) in
the United States. The authors ﬁnd this trend modest in comparison with trends of issue
partisanship, that is, alignment between attitude scales and the left-right scale. However,
in light of the overall negative trend we ﬁnd for the German case (coefﬁcient520.04 per
decade), Baldassarri and Gelman’s results have to be re-evaluated. In contrast to
Germany, which is seeing an overall decreasing trend of polarization for attitudes towards
most issues, POP seems to have slightly increased in the United States.23 In addition,
whereas the politically interested experience a stronger positive trend of attitude
21 Note, for example, that there is a scaling problem inherent to the measure: not all of the items have
the same scale range, which is between 3 and 7 for the selected variables; see Table 1. Variance, however, is
a function of variable scaling; higher-scaled variables are expected to produce higher levels of variance.
22 See, for example, Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Adams, Green and Milazzo 2012a.
23 Surely, this comparison is somewhat impaired by different samples of variables. However, the
estimates in both studies are very stable and rely on issues that are of true relevance, as they shape the
political debate in their own context.
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alignment than those who are less interested in the United States (see Baldassarri and
Gelman 2008, 435: Figure 8, Plot A), the opposite is true for Germany (see Figure 4).
Other European studies also ﬁnd generally decreasing levels of public polarization, for
example the British (Adams, Green and Milazzo 2012a,b) and Dutch cases (Adams, Vries
and Leiter 2011). We can only speculate that the diverging trends in the United States and
the examined European countries could be a consequence of elite polarization in the
United States on the one side, where conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans
seem to have left Congress,24 and depolarization in European party systems on the
other (as described for the British case by Adams, Green and Milazzo 2012a). There is
some agreement among German scholars that the party system has seen a trend of
depolarization in recent decades.25 Thus, parties seem to follow the same broad
decreasing trend we found for German public opinion. Nonetheless, we are not able to
make any assertions concerning the causal connection between the two phenomena. We
deliberately did not follow a partisan- or ideology-based perspective on polarization, as
partisan camps are more difﬁcult to identify in a multiparty setting than in a two-party
case like the United States, where such a perspective is more common.26 However, in
order to get a deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind mass polarization, we
suggest the connection between party polarization and POP from a comparative
perspective as an urgent topic for further research.
Beyond that, our approach and ﬁndings may prove useful for scholars of public
opinion in general, as they open multiple avenues of further research. One avenue
concerns the variety of substantive issues we have illuminated. Researchers of public
opinion have compared attitudes towards the issues investigated here both between units
and over time, for instance attitudes towards redistribution and the welfare state;27 gender
roles;28 attitudes towards moral topics such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia;29
and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.30 However, the perspective we
pursued in this study changes the main focus from simple averages to relations between
attitudes and distributions of attitudes among groups of people. We are convinced that
this changing focus may lead to a better understanding of public opinion in general and
reveal interesting insights, especially because the polarization aspect of attitudes—and its
development—have largely been neglected outside the United States.
A second avenue concerns a drawback regarding our measurement of polarization.
While it is possible to evaluate within-group polarization, between-group polarization has
received no scrutiny. Recently proposed measures31 illustrate that such approaches may
further enrich analyses. A possible way to preserve the advantages of the attitude
alignment measure used here, but to account for between-group differences nonetheless,
would be to calculate standardized Euclidean distances for a set of various attitude items,
and subsequently evaluate them along the lines of different groups. Evaluation of such
24 See, for example, Fleisher and Bond 2004.
25 For example, von Alemann 2010; Spier 2011.
26 For example, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Hetherington 2009.
27 See, for example, Andress and Heien 2001; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Blekesaune and Quadagno
2003; Larsen 2008.
28 See Davis and Greenstein 2009 for an overview.
29 See, for example, Carter, Carter and Dodge 2009; Cohen et al. 2006; Granberg and Granberg 1980;
Loftus 2001; Scott 1998; Yang 1997.
30 See, for example, Mayda 2006; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011.
31 For example, by Levendusky and Pope 2011.
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techniques should be the subject of future work. A third avenue concerns examining
explanations of trends and levels of POP in general. Studies that focus on single countries
are insufﬁcient in this regard. In our view, more comparative studies are needed that
investigate the causes of POP. Cross-country survey projects, like the Eurobarometer or
the European Social Survey, might offer data that are better suited to look for macro-level
factors that inﬂuence polarization trends. In this regard, studies such as Down and
Wilson (2010) can be regarded as fruitful starting points.
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TABLE 3 Used Variables from ALLBUS 1980–2010
Variable ’80 ’82 ’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98 ’00 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10
gender.job.child.1 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
gender.job.child.2 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
gender.job.child.3 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
gender.job.marriage ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
gender.help.husband.1 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
gender.help.husband.2 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
moral.marriage ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
moral.abortion ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
moral.euthanasia ’ ’ ’
moral.cannabis ’ ’ ’
moral.homosexuality ’ ’ ’
distribution.state.provide.welfare ’ ’ ’
distribution.proﬁts.1 ’ ’ ’
distribution.proﬁts.2 ’ ’ ’
distribution.social.inequality ’ ’ ’
distribution.income.incentive ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
distribution.rank.difference.1 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
distribution.rank.difference.2 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
immigration.asylum.seekers ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Variable ’80 ’82 ’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98 ’00 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10
immigration.non.eu.workers ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
immigration.lifestyle.adaption ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
immigration.no.cross.marriage ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
immigration.no.jobs.send.home ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
immigration.political.rights ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
Note: variables are separated into four issue blocks.
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Fig. 5. (Colour Online) Density curves of estimated overall and dimension-speciﬁc correlation trends for different
sets of models
Note: shaded areas indicate effects opposed to the models reported in the article based on the full set of variables
(indicated by a vertical red line). The small vertical black lines indicate point trend estimates of a singular model.
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Fig. 6. Correlation trends by issue dimension, over time
Note: reduced variable sample based on within-dimension sets of batteries. The lines are based on the
effects as estimated in Model C (‘By types of issue dimensions’). Shaded areas represent 90 per cent
conﬁdence intervals.
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Fig. 7. Correlation trends by issue dimension, over time
Note: based on cubic polynomial of trend speciﬁcation. The lines are based on the effects as estimated in
Model C (‘By types of issue dimensions’). Shaded areas represent 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
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